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I.

INTRODUCTION

In colonial America, the criminal justice system functioned without
either effective police forces or public prosecutors. Instead, victims paid
for warrants, did their own investigative work, and retained a private
attorney to write an indictment and prosecute the offender. Restitution
was emphasized over incarceration. In short, the victim was both a key
decisionmaker in, and a direct beneficiary of, the criminal justice
system. I
During the nineteenth century, the goals of the criminal justice system changed from restitution to deterrence and punishment, as a distinction was drawn between offenses against the social order (crimes)
and offenses between individuals (civil wrongs). The powers and responsibilities that victims previously held were assumed by public prosecutors as society's advocates. Today, public prosecutors decide whether
* This research was conducted by the Victim Services Agency under a grant from the
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. Special acknowledgment is due to
Lucy N. Friedman, Executive Director of the Victim Services Agency, for her guidance and
support throughout the study, and to the Kings County District Attorney's Office for their
cooperation in carrying out this research. The views contained herein are solely those of the
authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Division of Criminal Justice Services or
the Kings County District Attorney's Office.
** Director of Research and Evaluation, Metropolitan Assistance Corp., New York City.
M.S., University of Toronto, 1972; B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1970.
*** Research Associate, New York Criminal Justice Agency. M.S., University of Wisconsin, 1982; B.A., Earlham College, 1974.
****
Research Assistant, Department of Biological Sciences, Columbia University.
A.B., Bryn Mawr College, 1978.
1 See McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in CriminalJusice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 649, 649-50 (1976).
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charges will be filed, what charges to file, and what sanctions to request
the court to invoke.
The law no longer gives victims control over their cases. The formal role of victims in criminal proceedings generally is now confined to
testifying for the prosecution. Because most cases are disposed of without trial, however, many victims do not have the chance to tell their
story on the witness stand. Victims do participate informally in the
criminal justice process by providing prosecutors with information
about the crime. Even informally, however, it is unusual today for victims to be asked what action they believe the court should take; moreover, victims frequently are not informed of what happened in their case
or why. 2 The victim has been aptly characterized as the forgotten per3
son in criminal proceedings.
To some extent, the failure of court officials to grant victims an
informal role is surprising. Elected criminal justice officials certainly are
interested in promoting good relations with the public. They have a
particular stake in maintaining good relations with victims because victims' refusal to cooperate can cause them to lose cases. There are strong
reasons, however, why officials do not consult victims. Prosecutors have
political, legal, and administrative concerns that lead them to pursue
some cases less vigorously than others, and other cases not at all. 4 Moreover, the shared interest of prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys in
expediting cases and ensuring predictable outcomes, particularly in
lower criminal courts, results in well-defined norms prescribing appropriate dispositions for common offenses. 5 Case similarities are stressed,
while idiosyncrasies of cases, defendants, and victims are minimized.
Court officials often believe that victim participation in the decision
process would only reduce the predictability of outcomes and threaten
their interests.
Victims are not normally consulted by officials because they do not
understand that the prosecutor is not actually representing them, or necessarily acting only in their interest. Victims may become frustrated
2 W. McDonald, Notes on the Victim's Role in the Prosecutorial and Dispositional
Stages of the American Criminal Justice Process 14 (paper delivered at the Second International Symposium on Victimology, Boston (1976)).
3 See McDonald, Cri'inaljusticeand the Victim: An Introduction, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
THE VICTIM 17, 19 (W. McDonald ed. 1976) (6 Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals).
4 A. Goldstein, Defining a Role for the Victim in Criminal Prosecution 5 (paper
presented at the conference on "Victims and Criminal Justice," sponsored by the American
Jewish Congress and the New York University Law School (Feb. 26, 1978)).
5 See, e.g., J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); P. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); A. Ros~rr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY
CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE (1976).
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and angry when they see that an assault against them may be treated
only as disorderly conduct, that prosecutor and defense attorney appear
to collaborate rather than act as adversaries, that their cases receive only
a few minutes of the court's time, or that after pleading guilty, the defendant may be home before they are. If victims can be made to understand and feel a part of the criminal justice system, their participation
may not reduce the predictability of outcomes as much as officials fear.
II.

THE VICTIM INVOLVEMENT PROJECT

Recently, there have been efforts to aid victims in gaining greater
6
participation in and understanding of criminal court adjudication.
The Victim Involvement Project (VIP) is one such recent effort. VIP
grew out of research into the role of victims in criminal court decisionmaking. Most victims had personal desires that they hoped to realize by
cooperating with court officials. 7 Although the outcomes that many victims sought were not especially harsh,8 they seldom had an opportunity
to express their views to officials. Many victims were not even informed
of the outcome of their case. Not surprisingly, a majority of victims surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with their experience in the criminal justice system.
VIP was begun by the Vera Institute of Justice as a systematic effort to communicate the concerns of individual victims to officials in
Brooklyn Criminal Court, one of the busiest courts in the nation.9 The
6 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-35-3-2 (1982) (Indiana law requires prosecutors to inform victims of plea negotiations and to advise them that they may offer their opinions); W. KERSTETTER & A. HEINZ, PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: AN EVALUATION (Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1979) (relating an experiment in Dade County, Florida, in which court personnel were required, in selected cases, to hold pretrial conferences at
which victims, defendants, and arresting officers were allowed an opportunity to express their
opinions); R. ROSENBLUM & C. BLEW, VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE (1979) (report prepared for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration) (relating efforts of staff of victim assistance programs in Pima
County, Arizona, and Multnomah County, Oregon, to help victims prepare information to be
included in presentence reports to judges); Dubow & Becker, Patlerns-ofVictim Advocay, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 147 (W. McDonald ed. 1976) (6 Sage Criminal Justice
System Annuals) (discussing two community-based programs in Chicago that employed advocates to lobby court officials for stronger response to crimes that most concerned the community; one tactic used by the advocates was packing the courtroom in targeted cases with
local residents in a visible display of community concern).
7 R. Davis, V. Russell & F. Kunreuther, The Role of the Complaining Witness in an
Urban Criminal Court 23 (July 1980) (unpublished manuscript, Vera Institute of Justice,
New York).
8 Less than half wanted the defendant incarcerated; the remainder sought restitution,
protection, or a lesser form of punishment. Id.at 24. See a/so W. KERSTETrER & A. HEINZ,
supranote 6 (noting that in Dade County experiments, victims did not come to pretrial settlement conferences "looking for the maximum').
9 The Victim Involvement Project, funded by the Edna McConnel Clark Foundation,
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key idea behind VIP was the stationing of victim advocates in the courtroom. Advocates would ask victims what outcome they wanted, and
make sure the victims' concerns were communicated to court officials.
Advocates would also notify victims of upcoming dates when it was imperative that they be in court, help court personnel to avoid calling victims into court needlessly, and provide other services, such as orienting
victims to the court process and assisting them to secure the release of
vouchered property.
Because victim advocates were to be stationed in the courtroom,
the VIP had to be implemented through an organization with legal
standing in the court. The Kings County District Attorney's Office
agreed to cooperate with the Vera Institute in the project. A VIP representative was given space at the prosecutor's table in one all-purpose
courtroom that calendared between twenty and thirty cases per day.' 0
Prosecutors in that courtroom were instructed to listen to what VIP staff
had to say about the victim's viewpoint, to take that information into
account in deciding the state's position, and, where appropriate, to share
the information with the court.
VIP's organizers hoped to achieve greater success in having victims'
views heard by the court than victims had achieved on their own. VIP's
planners, and later its administrator, sought to bolster the relationship
between project staff and prosecutors by basing the relationship upon a
mutual exchange of services, in much the same way that exchange relationships exist throughout the court system." In return for prosecutors'
willingness to listen to their representations on behalf of victims, VIP
staff would notify victims to come to court when needed, provide prosecutors with a better description of the criminal incident based upon
VIP's conversations with victims, give prosecutors information about
victims' willingness to cooperate with authorities, and assist prosecutors
with clerical tasks in the courtroom. Close ties between VIP and the
district attorney's office, however, had major disadvantages. Project
staff could communicate their information about victims' interests only
to prosecutors; whether or not to pass the information along to judges
was within the prosecutors' discretion. It became clear that prosecutors
sometimes, with reason, did not convey the information to the judge;
was begun in April 1978 by the Vera Institute of Justice in cooperation with the Kings
County District Attorney's Office. Management of VIP was later transferred to the newly
created Victim Services Agency in July 1978.
10 All-purpose court parts handle many different types of proceedings for cases that have
not been disposed of at arraignment (these cases usually involve felony charges). Proceedings
that occur in all-purpose parts include preliminary hearings, motions, administrative dispositions, misdemeanor trials, and sentencing.
1 See Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 2 LAW & Soc'y REv. 331 (1970) (study of a prosecutor's office focusing on exchange relationships).
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VIP staff, then, were powerless to do anything. After the project began,
several more subtle drawbacks to the project's close alliance with the
prosecutor's office also became apparent.
The results of the VIP experiment are worth reviewing because of
what they reveal about decisionmaking in criminal courts, the role of
victims in that process, and the obstacles to reform of the process.
III.

METHOD

A nonequivalent control group, quasi-experimental design' 2 was
used to assess VIP's first-year impact. Before the project began, two
court parts in Brooklyn Criminal Court were examined and found to be
similar in terms of both the type and disposition of cases handled. Interviews conducted with victims from the two court parts revealed that the
parts also were similar with respect to victims' perceptions of the adjudication process.' 3 VIP was then introduced into one of the parts, which
became the "experimental" court part. The other part, which did not
4
receive VIP staff, was designated the control part.'
Following the implementation of VIP, several separate samples of
data were collected from each court part: (1) interviews with victims,
(2) case outcomes based on computerized court information, and (3)
records of restitution orders and written admonishments. To assess
VIP's effect upon victims' perceptions of the adjudication process, interviews were conducted with 295 victims whose cases were disposed of in
either the experimental or control court part between October 1978 and
January 1979. The interviews measured victims' perceptions of (a) the
fairness of case outcome, (b) the responsiveness of court officials to victims' concerns, (c) the adequacy of information that victims were given
about the progress of their cases in court, (d) their involvement in the
decision process, (e) their treatment by court officials, and (f) their willingness to cooperate with the criminal justice system in the future. In12 SeeD. CAMPBELL
FOR RESEARCH

&J.

STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS

(1963).

13 In order to ascertain whether the two court parts were similar in terms of victims'
perceptions of the court process, 96 victims whose cases were disposed of in either part were
interviewed. These interviews were virtually the same as those that were administered to
victims following VIP's implementation.
14 The design used was clearly less desirable than a design in which VIP staff would have
intervened in randomly selected cases in one or more court parts. The more rigorous design
was not chosen, however, because encouraging officials to consider the concerns of victims in
some cases would likely have resulted in heightened sensitivity to victims' concerns in control
cases as well. Another more rigorous design, random assignment of cases to experimental and
control parts, was administratively unfeasible. Any other more rigorous designs involving
multiple court parts would have been prohibitively expensive, administratively unworkable,
or both.
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15
terviews were completed with 142 victims in the experimental part
and 153 victims in the control part.' 6
In order to determine whether VIP had an effect upon court outcomes and sentences, a second sample of 1,108 cases disposed of either in
VIP's court part or in the control part was collected from computer files
of the Victim Services Agency. This sample represented all cases disposed of in the two court parts between November 1978 and January
1979.
VIP was expected to have the greatest impact on the court's use of
restitution and admonishments. Because the computer data base did
not contain indications of restitution or admonishments, manual logs of
the Victim Services Agency were used to compare (a) the frequency
with which the court ordered restitution in VIP's court part with the
frequency of restitution orders in the control part from November 1978
through July 1979, and (b) the frequency with which each court part
issued written admonishments from January through June 1979.17
Research teams also interviewed court officials and spent several
weeks observing in the VIP court part and in the victim reception area.
These data were used to aid in the interpretation of the other data
sources. 18

IV.
A.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

ALLEVIATING THE BURDEN OF COURT APPEARANCES UPON

VICTIMS

VIP's presence seemed to help humanize the court process for victims. For example, VIP was able to spare victims from needless trips to
court. Victims were excused from attending more scheduled court dates
in VIP's court part (36%) than in the control part (25%). 19
Victims who had contact with project staff reported that VIP did
much to reduce discomfort and confusion in the court process. The staff
assisted victims in numerous ways: helping to secure the return of
15 Totalling 67% of those attempted.
16 Totalling 60% of those attempted.
17 Restitution and admonishments are most frequently ordered in cases that are adjourned in contemplation of dismissal or in cases in which the defendant pleads guilty and
receives a sentence of conditional discharge. Cases adjourned in contemplation of dismissal
are held open for six months. If at the end of that time the defendant has not violated the
conditions set by the court and has not been rearrested, the case is dismissed. Both restitution
and admonishments are considered by the court when requested by the victim. Court officials initiate such actions on their own only infrequently.
18 For a fuller description of the study method and results, see R. Davis, M. Tichane & E.
Connick, First Year Evaluation of the Victim Involvement Program (Oct. 1980) (unpublished
report, Victim Services Agency, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services).
19 t = 2.47, df = 417, p < .01.
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vouchered property; obtaining permission from employers for victims to
take time off from work to attend court; and giving victims an explanation of the day's proceedings before they left court. VIP staff also encouraged court clerks to call the cases of victims who were present in
court at the beginning of the day so they would not have to wait. The
staff also requested closed hearings to lessen victims' discomfort in rape
cases. VIP was at its best helping victims to negotiate the court process
in these small but important ways.
VIP staff, however, did not always succeed in expediting things for
victims. Court clerks sometimes refused to call the cases of victims who
were present early in the day, and victims had to spend the whole day in
court even though the hearing itself might last for only half an hour.
Long waits at court were one of the most frequent complaints voiced by
victims interviewed in both the VIP and the control court parts.
Although VIP explained to victims what was happening at court, that
was not always enough to mollify those who were angry. For example,
VIP staff explained to one victim that his case had to be adjourned because the defense attorney had not appeared. The victim, who had been
waiting in court for some time, became furious and left, vowing not to
return. The project's close ties to the prosecutor's office also limited
VIP's effectiveness in aiding victims. Because the district attorney's office objected, for example, VIP could not notify victims of the outcome
20
when cases were dismissed.
Finally, role conflict among VIP staff at times hampered their ability to aid victims. Because of their close working relationship, VIP staff
tended to identify with prosecutors' interests and modes of behavior.
VIP staff sometimes described themselves to victims as members of the
prosecutor's staff. On occasion, they questioned victims in the same
brusque manner that prosecutors used. In one instance, a VIP representative was observed threatening to subpoena a victim who was reluctant
to return to court.
Because of these characteristics, VIP's activities had little demonstrable impact upon victims' perceptions of the court process. There
were no significant differences between VIP's court part and the control
part in the percentage of victims who felt that they had been treated
well in court, 2 1 who believed that they had been kept informed of the
20 The prosecutors argued that dismissals were usually the result of victims failing to appear in court; such victims, they said, probably would not be interested in the case outcome,
nor did they merit the courtesy of being informed. It seems likely, however, that the District
Attorney's Office was also concerned about the negative reactions that victims might have
upon finding out their case was dismissed.
21 44% compared to 37%, respectively.
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status of their case, 2 2 or who believed that the court was responsive to
their needs. 23 One victim summed it up well when she said that
although VIP staff members were "wonderful," she did not think that
they "really had the power to do anything."
B.

ADVOCATING FOR VICTIMS

When victims came to court, a VIP representative talked to them
about their interests as they waited in the reception center for their cases
to be called. That information was given to another VIP representative
in the courtroom, who passed it along to the prosecutor or, more rarely,
to the judge during a bench conference. Communicating the victim's
desires to officials was not always expected to result in the outcome that
the victim wanted. Where victims wanted restitution or a warning issued to the defendant to stay away from them, outcomes that were consistent with usual court practice, more victims were expected to receive
the outcomes that they sought.
Through their courtroom experience, VIP staff became familiar
with the outcomes that court officials believed appropriate for various
types of cases. In practice, VIP staff tended to interpret victims' desires
to more closely approximate these outcomes when presenting the information to prosecutors. At times, the staff also tried to dissuade victims
from seeking outcomes they thought were unrealistic, and suggested appropriate alternatives. In one case observed by researchers, for example,
a victim who had been shot in the hand told the VIP representative that
the defendant "should be put away-he's crazy." The VIP representative agreed to tell officials of the victim's wishes, but also suggested that
if the case were to be adjourned in contemplation of dismissal with an
order that the defendant pay restitution, the victim might recover his
hospital expenses. In discussing the case with the prosecutor, the VIP
24
representative mentioned only the victim's medical bills.
VIP's information about the outcomes desired by victims had a
limited effect upon court disposition. There was no significant difference
between the two court parts in victims' satisfaction with case outcomes
or in victims' beliefs that their desires had an effect on the outcome of
the case.2 5 Increases were observed in the frequency of both court22 27% compared to 34%, respectively.
23 37% compared to 38%, respectively.
24 Ironically, though he did not know that was what the victim wanted, the prosecutor
demanded jail time, and the case was held for the grand jury.
25 In VIP's part, 48% of victims reported being satisfied with the outcome of their case
and 44% reported having had an effect upon the outcome, compared to 43% and 45%, respectively, in the control part.
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TABLE 1
SENTENCES OF CONVICTED DEFENDANTS BY COURT PART"'

Conditional Discharge
Fine
Probation
Jail Time
Two Months or Less
Two to Six Months
More than Six Months
TOTALb

(n)

VIP Court Part
41%
21
12
10
12 ) 26
4

Control Court Part
29%
37
12
11
9 ) 22
2

100%

100%

(140)

(126)

Chi-square = 8.90 (p<.05)
aIn six cases where more than one type of sentence was imposed, defendants were categorized according to the most severe sentence (jail was regarded as most severe, conditional discharges least severe).
bExcludes nine cases in which sentences had not yet been imposed at the time of data
collection.

ordered restitution 26 and written admonishments warning defendants to
stay away from victims. 2 7 Table 1 shows sentences of convicted defend-

ants by court part. Consistent with the increase in the use of restitution
and admonishments, Table 1 shows that a greater proportion of convicted defendants in VIP's court part were sentenced to conditional discharges, in which the court often also orders defendants to pay
restitution or stay away from victims, and fewer were sentenced to pay
fines to the court than in the control part. Still, interviews with victims
in VIP's part revealed that 84% of those who had incurred property loss
or medical expenses were not awarded restitution. Moreover, failure to
obtain restitution was the second most commonly cited reason for victim
dissatisfaction with case outcomes, mentioned by 23% of dissatisfied
victims.
As expected, VIP was less successful in satisfying victims who desired punitive outcomes than those who desired restitution or protection.
Table 2 shows case dispositions by court part. Table 2 shows that there
were no significant differences between the court parts in either the pro26 5.6 cases per month in VIP's court part, compared to 2.6 cases per month in the control
part (t = 2.84, df = 16, p < .05).
27 6.3 admonishments per month in VIP's court part, compared to 0.7 per month in the
control part (t = 3.01, df = 10, p < .05).
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portion of cases held for the grand jury or misdemeanor convictions.
Moreover, among defendants convicted of misdemeanors, there were no
significant differences between the two court parts in the proportion of
defendants sentenced to serve time in jail.28 Failure of the court to punish defendants severely enough was the most frequently cited reason for
dissatisfaction with case outcomes, mentioned by 70% of victims.
Observations and interviews with court officials and VIP staff suggested that VIP had only a slight effect on case outcomes, in part because courtroom prosecutors, to whom VIP presented victims' concerns,
really did not have much discretion in deciding what sort of disposition
to seek in plea negotiations. One restriction on prosecutors arose from
their desire to accommodate the needs of other officials. One case observed by researchers, for example, had previously been adjourned for
the defendant to pay restitution to the victim, with the understanding
that it would be adjourned in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) once
the defendant paid.2 9 On the observation date, the defendant had not
yet paid. The VIP representative asked the prosecutor to request another adjournment, arguing that, if the ACD were granted immediately,
the likelihood of payment would be reduced. Judges dislike carrying
open cases on their calendars, however, when the cases can be disposed
of readily. Although the prosecutor had no particular interest in the
TABLE 2
CASE DISPOSITIONS BY COURT PART
VIP Court Part

Control Court Part

Dismissal
Adjournment in
Contemplation of
Dismissal

29%

30%

12

10

Guilty Plea
Case Transferred to
Grand Jury

32

33

26

27

Other

TOTAL

(n)

*

*

100%

100%

(555)

(553)

*Less than 0.5%

28 See supra Table 1.
29 ACIDs are dismissed in six months if the defendant is not rearrested and abides by

special conditions set by the court. In practice, few ACDs are reopened even if conditions are
violated.
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immediate granting of the ACD, he acquiesced to the judge's wish, over
the protest of the VIP representative.
Courtroom prosecutors' discretion, and therefore their ability to
take victims' interests'into account, was also restricted by the policies of
their own office. In Brooklyn, each felony case is reviewed prior to arraignment by a senior prosecutor who writes instructions for the lessexperienced courtroom prosecutors, telling them how to handle the case.
After disposition, in addition, serious felony cases and all dismissed felonies are reviewed by supervisors to make sure that the courtroom prosecutor acted in accordance with office policy and the screening
prosecutor's instructions. A Legal Aid Society supervisor said that he
doubted that VIP's information about victims' interests would have an
impact because, in his opinion, courtroom prosecutors were afraid to use
their own judgment and to go against the instructions of the screening
prosecutor.
These constraints, and the natural inclination of prosecutors not to
relinquish any of their control over cases to VIP, meant that prosecutors
frequently did not convey VIP's information about victims' concerns to
judges and probably often failed to use the information in determining
their own position in cases as well. It was for these reasons that open
disagreements occasionally arose between VIP staff and prosecutors,
and that VIP staff sought direct access to judges by taking part in bench
conferences.
C.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROJECT BY COURT OFFICIALS

Prosecutors accepted having a VIP representative at their table,
and seemed to value some of the services that VIP staff offered. For
example, nine of ten prosecutors interviewed agreed that VIP's efforts to
get victims to court helped the court to run more smoothly. 30 Nine of
the ten prosecutors also felt that VIP staff performed an important cleri3
cal function. '
Prosecutors were much less receptive, however, to VIP activities
that had an impact on case decisionmaking. Before the project began,
VIP staff were admonished by the District Attorney's Criminal Court
30 Research data showed that, indeed, VIP's efforts to notify victims of court dates met
with some success. Sixty-eight percent of interviewed victims with cases in VIP's court part
reported coming to court at least once, compared to 57% of victims with cases in the control
part (t = 2.01, df = 291, p < .025). Victims in the control part were also sent notification
letters through another source. There was, however, no telephone follow-up to the letters.
31 Clerical tasks that VIP performed included calling in victims on telephone alert status
whose presence was needed, aiding prosecutors with paperwork, calling the grand jury to find
out whether an indictment had been filed, and so forth.
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Bureau Chief against interfering in case processing. Because the exact
purpose of the project was to affect case decisionmaking, however, some
conflict between VIP staff and prosecutors was inevitable as prosecutors
saw their authority as the sole representative of the "people's" viewpoint
challenged. 32 Five of the ten prosecutors interviewed believed that VIP
staff sometimes went too far in encouraging consideration of victims'
interests. VIP staff and prosecutors also disagreed about sharing information that some victims were unwilling to come to court. Project staff
sometimes obtained this information when notifying victims of court
dates. Observations of researchers and interviews with VIP staff both
suggested that prosecutors very rarely shared this information with
judges or defense attorneys. In several instances, this led to open disagreement between VIP staff, who thought the information should be
shared, and prosecutors, who did not.
Prosecutors tended to be uneasy about direct interaction between
VIP staff and judges, and within the first few months of the project's
inception, the district attorney's office established a rule that VIP staff
should not initiate conversations with judges. Still, some prosecutors
permitted VIP staff to approach the bench with them for plea
conferences.
Judges, more so than prosecutors, seemed to value VIP as a source
of information about cases and felt that VIP's familiarity with cases
aided the decision process. 33 Sometimes, judges questioned VIP staff
about victims; at other times, VIP staff volunteered information to the
judges. As time went on, relationships did develop between VIP staff
and judges assigned to the court part.
Legal Aid Society attorneys were less than enthusiastic about VIP's
presence in the courtroom. Several felt that VIP staff worked so closely
with prosecutors that the project was simply "an arm of the prosecution." They believed that the project hindered the defense by bringing
more victims to court, by "pressuring" victims into cooperating with the
prosecution even when the victims were willing to drop the case, and by
32 After one series of vocal disagreements in the courtroom between a VIP representative

and a prosecutor, a meeting was called by the bureau chief to discuss VIP's interference in
cases. One of the statements made at the meeting was that VIP staff should never openly
disagree with prosecutors in the courtroom; if a problem arose, the VIP representative was to
wait until later to deal with it. It was also stated that VIP staff had no right to suggest to a
prosecutor what to do with a case and that VIP staff should not even talk in the courtroom
(instead, they should communicate with prosecutors in writing). Ultimately, no strict rules
were laid down, but the message was clear that VIP staff ought to exercise greater restraint.
33 For example, one judge who was interviewed said that while she was presiding in VIP's
court part, several new prosecutors were assigned to the part. According to the judge, VIP
staff often had to give her information about victims and facts about the incident because the
prosecutors "didn't know what they were doing. The VIP staff were the only people who
knew what was going on. I don't know what I would have done without them."
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restricting the defense's access to victims in the victim reception center. 34
V.

CONCLUSION

VIP was intended to provide a service to all parties in Brooklyn
Criminal Court by facilitating communication between court officials
and victims. Yet once the project began, prosecutors became upset by
what they felt was a project bias toward victim interests, and defense
attorneys became upset by what they saw as a project bias toward prosecution interests. Indeed, VIP staff could hardly have avoided becoming
caught up in partisan conflicts in an environment in which three different points of view-prosecution, defense, and victim-compete for
supremacy. To a far greater extent than in other Vera Institute
projects, VIP staff were supposedto cultivate relationships with other parties in the court, in particular with prosecutors and victims. Working
closely with both of these groups on a daily basis, VIP staff developed
allegiances to each.
Getting caught up in partisan struggles produced manifest role conflict among VIP staff and, in some ways, blunted the project's effectiveness. The close formal relationship between VIP and the prosecutors'
office, and the identification with prosecutors' values that VIP staff developed over time tended to "reform" the project in ways that were unforeseen by its planners. Actions were sometimes taken that were
inconsistent with victims' interests. The knowledge that VIP staff developed of dispositions appropriate to particular types of offenses led them
to predict outcomes and, at times, fail to communicate victims' desires
that the staff thought were inconsistent with those predictions. 35 Moreover, the close association of VIP staff with the prosecution alienated
defense attorneys who might have been willing to work toward mutually
acceptable outcomes, particularly restitution.
On the other hand, the allegiance that VIP staff felt toward victims
lessened prosecutors' acceptance of the staff. Some prosecutors felt that
VIP staff inappropriately took the side of victims over that of the district
attorney's office, and encouraged administrators in the prosecutor's office to restrict the project's activities.
VIP was also hampered by the lack of incentive for officials to include victims' interests routinely in deciding case outcomes. VIP was
based upon a technocratic reform premise that court officials, if given a
34 One defense attorney objected so strongly to a VIP representative's participation at a
bench conference that he asked the judge to hold her in contempt, to bar her from the courtroom, and to subpoena her records.
35 For an extensive treatment of how the court system "reforms" reform projects, see F.
Dill, Bail and Bail Reform: A Sociological Study (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley).
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more comprehensive information base, will use the information to make
"better" decisions. 36 The experience of VIP, like the experience of other
reform programs based on the same premise, 37 suggests that merely providing court officials with the opportunity for changed behavior is not
sufficient to bring about reform when they have a stake in maintaining
the status quo. To be successful, a reform project must alter the incen38
tives of those whose behavior it seeks to change.
The small incentives that VIP had to offer prosecutors, such as improved information about cases, getting victims to court, and clerical
assistance, could not offset the strong motivations for prosecutors not to
consider victims' interests. Greater responsiveness to victims' interests
often would have meant seeking dispositions that deviated both from
established norms and from the expectations of other court officials.
The result might have been increased difficulty in reaching negotiated
dispositions, more trials, more time in court, and less intra-system cooperation. More importantly, by routinely presenting victims' interests to
the court, prosecutors risked the possibility that the victim's position
would be accepted by judges in lieu of their own. Judges might have
been less willing to drop cases that prosecutors considered inconsequential if they knew that victims were adamant about prosecuting. Conversely, judges might have been less willing to pursue cases that the
district attorney's office had an interest in pursuing if they knew that
victims were not interested in cooperating. Prosecutors stood to lose
some of their control over cases if victims' interests were regularly available for the court to consider.
In retrospect, it is easy to see some of the problems created by VIP's
particular method of trying to introduce reform. It is harder, however,
to suggest a better approach to encouraging consideration of the victim's
viewpoint in case decisionmaking.
One thing that VIP's experience did suggest is that prosecutors are
particularly likely to resist consideration of the victim's point of view
because it is prosecutors' control that would be most eroded if the victim
were given a greater voice. Because of this, it probably would be far
more effective to present victims' interests directly to judges rather than
rely on prosecutors to do so. Judges, as arbiters of different viewpoints,
might be more receptive to a "second opinion" on what the commu36 See R. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS

20-21 (1978).

37 See, e.g., Lenihan, Telephones and RaisingBail: Some Lessons in EvaluationResearch, 1 EvALUATION Q. 569 (1977) (reform allowing defendants detained after arraignment on bail to

make call from detention for purpose of raising bail); F. Dill, supra note 35 (pretrial release
program).
38 M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL 198-99 (1983).
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nity's interests are. 3 9
VIP's experience also suggests that because the disincentives for officials to consider victims' interests are strong, programmatic action may
not bring about change unless it is accompanied by legislative action
mandating that victims be given the chance to express their opinions
orally or in writing. Obviously, legislative action would not guarantee
acceptance of change by local criminal court officials. Conferring upon
victims some measure of legal standing in court, however, would seem to
be a precondition to serious consideration of their interests by officials.
Such legislative change, linked with programmatic action as the vehicle
for gathering and distributing information about victims' interests, may
be the best way to restore victims to the position of interested parties in
criminal cases.
Victims' views may not always be identical to those of the community, but they probably are often closer to the public's sentiments than
those of courthouse professionals, who have a substantial interest in
processing cases in summary fashion and who may tend to become insensitive to the human suffering involved in the "normal crimes" they
process.4° In the vast majority of criminal cases, those that the public
never hears about, victims' opinions could add another perspective from
which to view incidents brought before the court.

39 Placing the victim in the process as a party would force the prosecutor to justify to the
court his decision not to proceed, or to proceed on assumptions about the facts and the law
that differ from the victim's account. It would provide the judge with a party who has a
genuine interest in challenging and correcting the version of fact and law preferred by the
prosecutor or defense counsel or both. A. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 11.
40 Se Sudnow, Normal Crines: SociologicalFactorsof/he PenalCode in a Public Defender's Ofce,
12 Soc. PROBs. 255 (1965).

